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The security proofs of continuous-variable quantum key distribution are based on the assumptions that the
eavesdropper can neither act on the local oscillator nor control Bob’s beam splitter. These assumptions may be
invalid in practice due to potential imperfections in the implementations of such protocols. In this paper, we
consider the problem of transmitting the local oscillator in a public channel and propose a wavelength attack
which can allow the eavesdropper to control the intensity transmission of Bob’s beam splitter by switching
the wavelength of the input light. Specifically we target continuous-variable quantum key distribution systems
that use the heterodyne detection protocol using either direct or reverse reconciliation. Our attack is proved
to be feasible and renders all of the final key shared between the legitimate parties insecure, even if they have
monitored the intensity of the local oscillator. To prevent our attack on commercial systems, a simple wavelength
filter should be randomly added before performing the monitoring detection.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two distant part-
ners, Alice and Bob, to share common secret keys in the pres-
ence of an eavesdropper, Eve [1, 2]. In theory, the uncondi-
tional security of QKD protocol is guaranteed based on the
laws of physics, in particular the no-cloning theorem. But in
practice, the key components of practical QKD systems have
imperfections that do not fulfill the assumptions of ideal de-
vices in theoretical security proofs. In discrete-variable QKD,
the imperfect devices such as single photon detectors, phase
modulators, Faraday mirrors and fiber beam splitters, open se-
curity loopholes to Eve and lead to various types of attacks [3–
12].
Continuous-variable (CV) QKD [13] has developed im-
mensely over the past decade [14] to the point that there
are companies selling commercially available systems [15,
16]. Even so, CV-QKD is potentially vulnerable to such
idealization-to-practical problems that plague its discrete vari-
able counterpart. In the CV-QKD protocols, Alice encodes the
key information onto the quadratures, Xˆ and Pˆ , on a bunch of
coherent states and sends them onto Bob. Bob measures one
or both quadratures by performing homodyne [17] or hetero-
dyne detection [18] on the signal with a relatively strong local
oscillator (LO). Finally, they perform direct or reverse recon-
ciliation and privacy amplification process to distill a common
secret key [1, 13]. In practice, it is extremely difficult for Bob
to generate the LO with the same initial polarization and phase
to Alice’s signal. Therefore, Alice prepares both the signal
and LO, and send them to Bob in the same optical fiber chan-
nel at the same time to avoid the large drifts of the relative
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polarization and phase [19]. However, this implementation
leaves a security loophole open for Eve.
In Ref. [20], the authors proposed an equal-amplitude at-
tack. To perform this attack, Eve first intercepts the signal
and LO, and measures both of the quadratures by performing
heterodyne detection on them. According to her measurement
results, she reproduces two weak squeezed states which have
the same intensity level to the signal, and sends them onto
Bob. Bob treats these two fake states as signal and LO, and
performs detections on them as usual. But now the detection
is neither homodyne nor heterodyne detection, therefore Eve
is able to make the extra noise of Bob’s measurement much
lower than the shot noise level. As a result, the total deviation
between Bob’s measurement and Alice’s preparation is lower
than the tolerable threshold derived from the theoretical secu-
rity proofs [21, 22]. Hence Alice and Bob can not discover
the presence of Eve.
In order to prevent this attack without modifying the origi-
nal measurement setup, Bob needs to monitor the total inten-
sity or the LO intensity [20]. We note that in this attack, Eve is
assumed to be unable to control the beam splitters of Bob. But
in one of our recent studies [12], we found that it is possible
for Eve to control the outputs of fiber beam splitters by utiliz-
ing its wavelength dependent property [23–25]. Importantly,
such wavelength dependent properties can be found in com-
mercial CV-QKD systems [15, 16]. Making use of this loop-
hole, we propose a new wavelength attack on a practical CV-
QKD system using heterodyne detection protocol [18]. By
using this attack Eve can in principle achieve all of the secret
key without being discovered, even if Bob has monitored the
total intensity or the LO intensity. Such an attack has practical
and commercial consequences.
In the security analysis of CV-QKD protocols with direct
(reverse) reconciliation, VA|B(VB|A), Alice (Bob)’s condi-
tional variance of Bob (Alice), has the similar status as the
quantum bit error rate (QBER) in the discrete-variable QKD
2protocols. To show that the hidden Eve would not be discov-
ered in our attack, our method is proving that the upper bound
of VA|B (VB|A) under our wavelength attack is always lower
than the maximum value allowed by the secret key rate for-
mula [18, 22].
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we first re-
view the heterodyne protocol and the wavelength-dependent
property of certain fiber beam splitters, then we propose a
wavelength attack scheme on an all-fiber CV-QKD system us-
ing heterodyne protocol in Section III. We prove the feasibility
of this wavelength attack in Section IV, and finally conclude
in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. Heterodyne detection protocol
In the heterodyne protocol [18], Alice first prepares a dis-
placed vacuum state that will be sent to Bob. This is realized
by choosing two real numbers XA and PA from a Gaussian
distribution of variance VA and zero mean. The whole ensem-
ble of coherent states Alice will send to Bob is given by the
thermal state with variance V = VA + 1. Bob receives this
coherent state and simultaneously measures both the ampli-
tude and phase quadratures of the state using heterodyne de-
tection. After repeating this process many times, they finally
extract a binary secret key by using either direct reconcilia-
tion [26] or reverse reconciliation algorithm [18]. A typical
CV-QKD system using heterodyne protocol can be realized
by the schematic shown in Fig. 1. In this scheme, time and
polarization multiplexing are used so that the signal and LO
can be transmitted in the same channel without interfering.
To avoid the equal-amplitude attack [20], Bob uses a 10:90
beam splitter(not depicted in the figure) before the polariza-
tion beam splitter to monitor the LO intensity[14].
FIG. 1: The schematic diagram of heterodyne detection protocol.
BSa: 1/99 beam splitter; BSb: 50/50 beam splitter; PM: phase mod-
ulator; AM: amplitude modulator; PBS: polarization beam splitter;
PC: polarization controller. Alice generates coherent light pulses by
a 1550 nm laser diode, then separates them into a weak signal and a
strong LO by a 1/99 beam splitter. The signal is then modulated ran-
domly following the centered Gaussian distribution in both quadra-
tures, by using phase and amplitude modulators. The signal and LO
are separated in time and modulated into orthogonal polarizations by
the PBS before begin inserted into the channel.
To perform the heterodyne detection, Bob uses the photo-
detector to convert the photons into a photocurrent iˆ. Here iˆ
and the photon number nˆ are related by iˆ = qnˆ = qaˆ†aˆ, where
aˆ and aˆ† are the annihilation and creation operators of the light
state, and q is a suitable constant [27]. The extra quantum
noise δαˆv is unavoidable in Bob’s measurement results when
he uses heterodyne detection due to the unused port of the
50 : 50 beam splitter. To show this, let us first describe the
signal and LO by operators αˆs and αˆLO, respectively. These
operators can be broken up into two contributions [28]: the
mean values of the amplitude α as well as the quantum noise
fluctuations δα. The operators can be written as
αˆs = αs + δαˆs,
αˆLO = αLO + δαˆLO.
(1)
where αs and αLO are complex numbers and we assume that
the amplitude of the LO is much larger than the signal, i.e.,
|αLO| ≫ |αs|, and δαˆs and δαˆLO are the fluctuations of the
signal and LO, respectively.
The photocurrents read by the four photo-detectors can be
written as follows
iˆ1 = q(α
∗
LO + δαˆ
′†
LO + α
∗
s + δαˆ
′†
s )×
(αLO + δαˆ
′
LO + αs + δαˆ
′
s)/4,
iˆ2 = q(α
∗
LO + δαˆ
′†
LO − α∗s − δαˆ
′†
s )×
(αLO + δαˆ
′
LO − αs − δαˆ′s)/4,
iˆ3 = q[e
−ipi
2 (α∗LO + δαˆ
′†
LO) + α
∗
s + δαˆ
′†
s ]×
[ei
pi
2 (αLO + δαˆ
′
LO) + αs + δαˆ
′
s]/4,
iˆ4 = q[e
−ipi
2 (α∗LO + δαˆ
′†
LO)− α∗s − δαˆ
′†
s ]×
[ei
pi
2 (αLO + δαˆ
′
LO)− αs − δαˆ′s]/4.
(2)
Here we have absorbed the vacuum noise terms δαˆv into the
terms δαˆ′. For simplicity, let us assume that αLO is a real
number. To derive the quadratures Xˆ and Pˆ , the difference of
the two photocurrents should be measured
ˆδix = i1 − i2
≈ q(αLOα∗s + αLOαs + αLOδαˆ
′†
s + αLOδαˆ
′
s)/2
= qαLO2 (αs + α
∗
s + δαˆ
′
s + δαˆ
′†
s )
= qαLO2 (X + δXˆ
′),
→ XˆB = 2qαLO ˆδix = X + δXˆ ′,
ˆδip = i3 − i4
≈ q(iαLOα∗s − iαLOαs + iαLOδαˆ
′†
s − iαLOδαˆ′s)/2
= qαLO2 (
αs−α∗s
i +
δαˆ′s−δαˆ
′†
s
i )
= qαLO2 (P + δPˆ
′),
→ PˆB = 2qαLO ˆδip = P + δPˆ ′, (3)
where X ≡ αs + α∗s and P ≡ −i(αs − α∗s) are the exact
quadratures that Bob wants to measure, δXˆ ′ ≡ (δαˆs+δαˆ†s)+
(δαˆv + δαˆ
†
v) = δXˆ + δXˆv and δPˆ ′ ≡ −i(δαˆs − δαˆ†s) −
i(δαˆv−δαˆ†v) = δP+δPv are the quantum noises entering into
Bob’s measurement. Several terms have been neglected above
according to the fact that |αLO| ≫ |αs|. δXˆ and δPˆ satisfy
the canonical commutation relation [δXˆ, δPˆ ] = 2i, therefore
3the Heisenberg uncertainty relation 〈(δXˆ)2〉〈(δPˆ )2〉 = 1 is
derivable [27].
Under the condition that Eve cannot act on the LO (a com-
mon assumption in the security proofs [1]), it is only when the
excess noise reaches two times the shot-noise level that Eve
can perform an intercept-resend attack on the channel [29].
It is due to the fact that Eve will introduce vacuum noise by
using heterodyne detection and consequently, suffer the quan-
tum fluctuations when she reproduces the signal state in a sim-
ple intercept-resend attack.
B. Wavelength-dependent fiber beam splitter
In Ref. [12], we studied the wavelength-dependent prop-
erty of the fiber beam splitter which is made by the fused
biconical taper technology [23]. The fused biconical taper
beam splitter is made by closing two or more bare optical
fibers, fusing them in a high temperature environment and
drawing their two ends at the same time. Subsequently, a
specific biconic tapered waveguide structure can be formed
in the heating area. The fused biconical taper beam split-
ter is widely use in the fiber QKD systems because of the
feature of low insertion loss, good directivity and low cost.
However, intensity transmission of the fused biconical ta-
per beam splitter is wavelength-dependent, and most types
of fused biconical taper beam splitters work only in a lim-
ited range of wavelengths (limited bandwidths), where the
intensity transmission of the beam splitter can be defined as
T ≡ Iport1/(Iport1 + Iport2), where Iport1 (Iport2) is output
light intensity from beam splitter’s output port 1 (2). Typical
coupling ratio at the center wavelength provides optimal per-
formance, but the intensity transmission varies periodically
with wavelength changes. The relationship between wave-
length λ and the intensity transmission T by using the cou-
pling model is given in Ref. [24, 25]:
T = F 2 sin2
(
Cλ5/2w
F
)
≡ T (λ). (4)
where F 2 is the fraction of power coupled, C · λ5/2 is the
coupling coefficient, and w is the heat source width.
III. WAVELENGTH ATTACK ON A CV-QKD SYSTEM
USING HETERODYNE PROTOCOL
The basic idea of the wavelength attack is shown in Fig. 2.
Eve intercepts the coherent states sent by Alice. She makes
heterodyne measurement of the signal using the LO to achieve
the quadrature values XE and PE . After that, Eve generates
and re-sends three coherent states: a fake signal state |α′s〉, a
fake LO state |α′LO〉 and together with a ancillary state |α3〉.
Different from the previous intercept-resend attack, these fake
states have different wavelengthes, denoted as λ1 (for |α′s〉),
λ2 (for |α′LO〉) and λ3 (for |α3〉). According to Eq. (4), the
performance of Bob’s beam splitter is dependent on the wave-
length of the incoming light. Therefore the fake signal with
FIG. 2: (Color on line)The schematic diagram of the wavelength at-
tack scheme. WT-LD: the wavelength tunable laser diode; IM: the
intensity modulator; BS: 50/50 beam splitter. The WT-LD and IM
are used in producing fake coherent states with the specific wave-
length and amplitude set by the controller. The red (dotted) beam
splitters are the ones controlled by Eve. The red beam splitter on the
left has transmission T1, while the red beam splitter down the bottom
has transmission T2. For simplicity, the 10:90 beam splitter and the
generation of |α3〉 are not shown.
wavelength λ1, the transmission of Bob’s beam splitter is de-
termined by the function T (λ1) which is defined in Eq. (4).
Similarly, the intensity transmission of Bob’s beam splitter to
the fake LO state is determined by T (λ2). In other words, Eve
can control Bob’s beam splitter by tuning the wavelength of
her fake states.
With the help of the wavelength tunable laser diodes and
intensity modulators, the wavelength and amplitude of these
fake states are carefully chosen to satisfy the following condi-
tions
(i) (1− T ′3)|α′3|2 + (1 − T ′1)|α′s|2 + (1− T ′2)|α′LO|2
= 0.1|αLO|2,
(ii) (1− T1)(1− 2T1)T ′1|α′s|2 + (1− T2)(2T2 − 1)T ′2|α′LO|2
=
√
ηXE |αLO|
2 ,
(iii) T1(1− 2T1)T ′1|α′s|2 + T2(2T2 − 1)T ′2|α′LO|2
=
√
ηPE |αLO|
2 , (5)
where Ti ≡ T (λi) ∈ [0, 1](i = 1, 2), T ′j ≡ T ′(λj) ∈
[0, 1](j = 1, 2, 3). Here η is the channel transmission effi-
ciency, |αs| and |αLO| are the amplitudes of the original sig-
nal and the LO, respectively, |α′s|, |α′LO| and α′3 are the ampli-
tudes of the fake signal and the fake LO, T ′j are the intensity
transmissions of Bob’s 10:90 beam splitter (for monitoring the
LO light intensity).
Condition (i) makes sure the method of monitoring the LO
intensity is invalid to Eve. Here we assume that Bob uses
a 10:90 beam splitter to split the total light before being in-
serted into the PBS [31]. Because the 10:90 beam splitter is
also wavelength-dependent, its intensity transmission can be
determined by a function similar to Eq. (4), which is denoted
by T ′(λ) ≃ F ′2 sin2(C′λ5/2w′F ′ ). Here |α3〉 is used for com-
pensating the intensity when α′s and α′LO are both small. Eve
selects an appropriate wavelength λ3 such that T3 = 0, there-
fore the intensity of |α3〉 is much lower than the shot noise
level and negligible.
As Bob measures the quadratures XˆB and PˆB by perform-
ing heterodyne detection on the fake signal and the fake LO,
conditions (ii) and (iii) make Bob’s measurement results co-
4incide with the ones attained by Eve. To see explicitly where
these relations come from, see Eqs. (B6) and (B7) in the Ap-
pendix. Notice that the fake signal and the fake LO have dif-
ferent wavelengths, and hence, no interference occurs in this
detection. The effect of this on the measurement detection is
that we no longer have heterodyne detection outputs but rather
outputs that are proportional to Eve’s measurements. There-
fore, the photocurrents recorded by the photo-detectors con-
sist of parts from the signal and the LO. Eve should also make
T ′1|α′s|2 and T ′2|α′LO|2 much smaller than |αLO|2 in order to
suppress the shot noise. We are going to prove in Section IV
that the extra noise introduced by Bob’s measurement is much
lower than the shot-noise level, therefore the total noise can be
kept under the alarm threshold. In other words, Eve can safely
achieve the key information without being discovered by Al-
ice or Bob.
Finally, we note that as there are limitations on the intensi-
ties, conditions (ii) and (iii) may not always be satisfied. How-
ever, as the analysis in Appendix. A, we find that the probabil-
ity of failing condition (ii) or (iii) is extremely close to zero.
IV. FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS
To analyze the feasible of the wavelength attack, we first
note that the following assumptions should be satisfied:
(1) This attack is restricted to an all-fiber coherent-state CV-
QKD using heterodyne protocol.
(2) All of Bob’s beam splitters have the same wavelength
dependent property, i.e., their intensity transmissions are all
determined by Eq.(4) with the same parameters. This func-
tion and the detection efficiencies of Bob’s detectors are both
known by Eve. Here we assume that the detection efficiencies
are wavelength independent for simplicity. In practice, Eve
can simply absorb the differences into the light amplitudes
modulated by her and the final results are unchanged.
(3) Eve has the ability to replace the quantum channel with
a noiseless fiber, and her detectors have high efficiency and
negligible excess noise.
Before analyzing the feasibility of the wavelength attack,
let us first rapidly review the security analysis of the Gaus-
sian protocols based on coherent states and heterodyne detec-
tions under individual attacks. In what follows, we restrict
ourselves to Gaussian attacks which are proven optimal [30].
In the case of Gaussian attacks, the channel connecting Al-
ice and Bob can be fully characterized by its transmission η,
and its excess noise ǫ above the shot noise level, such that the
total noise measured by Bob is 1+ηǫ (in shot noise units) [19].
Alternatively, one may use the total added noise defined as
χ ≡ (1 − η)/η + ǫ for convenience. The secret key rates for
Heisenberg-limited individual attack in direct reconciliation
and reverse reconciliation are given, respectively, by [30]
KDR = log2
(1 + χ)[1 + η(V + χ)]
(1 + χV )[1 + η(1 + χ)]
, (6)
KRR = log2
V + η(1 + χV )
η(1 + χV )[1 + η(1 + χ)]
, (7)
where V = VA + 1 is the variance of Alice’s modulated
state as it was mentioned in Sec.II.A. Note that we use
the ‘Heisenberg-limited attack’ rather than the optimal at-
tack [22, 30] as such an attack upper bounds Eve’s information
thereby emphasizing our wavelength attack which can even
beat such a stringent attack. From the above formulas, we
can see that when V and η are settled in practice, the secret
key rate is fully determined by χ, which can be precisely esti-
mated from the experimental data [19].
Another important parameter in the security proof is Al-
ice’s (Bob’s) conditional variance of Bob’s (Alice’s) measure-
ment VA|B (VB|A) in direct reconciliation (reverse reconcil-
iation),which can be thought of as the uncertainty in Alice’s
(Bob’s) estimates of Bob’s (Alice’s) quadrature measurement
result. In the CV-QKD, Alice and Bob use VA|B (VB|A) to
estimate the shot noise and modulation imperfections [19].
VA|B is defined(where both quadratures are symmetrized) as
VA|B = 〈X2A〉 − 〈XAXˆB〉
2
〈Xˆ2B〉
, (8)
and similarly, we have VB|A defined as
VB|A = 〈Xˆ2B〉 − 〈XAXˆB〉
2
〈X2A〉
. (9)
We note that VA|B(VB|A) performs a role in CV-QKD pro-
tocols similar as the quantum bit error rate in discrete variable
QKD protocols, which provide Alice and Bob an intuitive tool
to detect the presence of Eve. To clarify this idea, let us first
state the relation between VA|B(VB|A) and χ. As the Gaussian
character of the channel maintains no matter Eve performs the
Gaussian attacks or not, the conditional variance between Al-
ice and Bob, which we will denote as V normalA|B and V normalB|A ,
can be calculated as follows [30]
V normalA|B =
(V − 1)[η(χ+ 1) + 1]
η(V + χ) + 1
, (10)
V normalB|A =
1
2
[η(1 + χ) + 1]. (11)
Note that there may be a little different from the expressions
in [30] due to the differences on the definitions of V.
On the other hand, to make the secret key rate positive, we
require that ( according to Eq. (6) and (7) )
χ < χDRmax =
√
4η2 + 1− 1
2η
, (12)
with 23 < η < 1 for direct reconciliation or
χ < χRRmax =
√
( 4η2 + 1)V
2 − 2V + 1− V − 1
2V
, (13)
with 0 < η < 1 for reverse reconciliation, should be satisfied.
Combining Eq. (10) with Eq. (12), we can find that for the
sake of deriving a positive secret key rate, the upper bound of
V normalA|B yields
V maxA|B =
(V−1)(
√
4η2+1+2η+1)√
4η2+1+2ηV+1
. (14)
5In other words, if VA|B is smaller than this threshold, the het-
erodyne protocol in direct reconciliation is considered to be
secure. Similarly, the upper bound of V normalB|A is derived to
be
V maxB|A =
√
(4+η2)V 2−2η2V+η2+(η+2)V−η
4V .
(15)
And the heterodyne protocol in reverse reconciliation is con-
sidered to be secure if VB|A is smaller than this threshold.
For these reasons, we can prove our attack feasible by
showing that Eve can make VA|B < V maxA|B (in the direct rec-
onciliation protocol) and VB|A < V maxB|A (in the reverse rec-
onciliation protocol) when she is performing the wavelength
attack.
A. Eve’s Wavelength Attack
When Eve performs the wavelength attack, with channel
noise, from a real value XA chosen by Alice to the measure-
ment result XˆB achieved by Bob is listed as follows (we write
down the quadrature Xˆ only since the other quadrature Pˆ can
be presented in the similar way)
XA → XˆA = XA + NˆA
→ XˆE = 1√
2
(XˆA + NˆE) (16)
→ XˆB = √ηXˆE + NˆB,
where NˆE represents the vacuum noise in Eve’s heterodyne
detection whose variance is normalized to 1, and NˆB is the
vacuum noise introduced by the heterodyne detection. The
variance of each of the terms is given by: VE = 12 (V + 1)
and VB = ηVE + VNB . Here VNB can then be considered
as Eve’s conditional variance of Bob’s measurement result. In
Appendix B, we derive the value of VNB and show that it is
smaller than 0.13. We are now ready to derive the conditional
variances under Eve’s attack, which are denoted as V attackA|B
and V attackB|A .
1. V attack
A|B in direct reconciliation
According to the definition of VA|B in Eq. (8), the value of
V attackA|B can be computed as follows
V attackA|B =
2(VNB+η)(V−1)
2VNB+η(V+1)
. (17)
Combining with Eq. (B10,B11) and the discussions above, we
can estimate that the value of V attackA|B is not larger than 1.9.
As shown in Fig. 3 (where we set V = 11 and ǫ = 0.01 [22]),
V attackA|B is always lower than V
max
A|B , so that Alice and Bob can
never discover the eavesdropper under this attack. Besides,
one should notice that V attackA|B is always lower than the nor-
mal level when the channel loss is larger than 0.58 dB, there-
fore Eve should increase the deviations on purpose to make
V attackA|B close to V
normal
A|B in order to avoid suspicion.
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FIG. 3: (Color on line)In direct reconciliation, the relation between
the channel loss and the conditional variance VA|B in three cases: (a)
the maximum tolerable value Vmax
A|B . (b) the value of V normalA|B and
(c) the value of V attackA|B . See main text for details. The curves are
plotted for experimentally realistic values, V = 11 and ǫ = 0.01.
We can see that V attackA|B is always lower than V maxA|B and lower than
V normal
A|B when the channel loss is larger than 0.58 dB at which point
the key between Alice and Bob is no longer secure.
2. V attackB|A in reverse reconciliation
In reverse reconciliation, using Eq. (9) with Eq. (16), the
value of V attackB|A can be computed as
V attackB|A = η + VNB . (18)
Combining with Eq. (B10,B11) and the discussions above, we
can estimate that the value of V attackB|A is never larger than η +
0.13. As shown in Fig. 4 (where again we have set V = 11
and ǫ = 0.01), it is always lower than the value of V maxB|A so
that Alice and Bob can never discover the eavesdropper under
such an attack. Besides, one should notice that V attackB|A is
lower than the V normalB|A when the channel loss is larger than
0.58 dB. Hence, Eve should increase the deviations to make
V attackA|B close to V
normal
A|B in order to avoid suspicions.
V. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION
There are two points about the wavelength attack that
should be remarked:
1. As shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, V attackA|B and V attackB|A
are lower than V normalA|B and V normalB|A respectively when
η < 0.88. It is impossible when the protocol works nor-
mally, therefore Eve should add extra noise on her mea-
surement result to increase V attackA|B and V attackB|A . So that
perfect heterodyne detection is not necessary for Eve.
In other words, assumption (3) listed in Section IV can
be compromised.
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FIG. 4: (Color on line)In reverse reconciliation, the relation between
the channel loss and the conditional variance VB|A in three cases: (a)
the maximum tolerable value V max
B|A . (b) the value of V normalB|A and
(c) the value of V attackB|A . See main text for details. The curves are
plotted for experimentally realistic values, V = 11 and ǫ = 0.01.
We can see that V attackB|A is always lower than VmaxB|A and lower than
V normal
B|A when the channel loss is greater than 0.58 dB, again leading
to an insecure key.
2. In theory, the wavelength attack cannot be avoided by
adding wavelength filter before the monitoring detector,
because Eve can simply increase the input light inten-
sity [12]. To make this method work, Bob should ran-
domly choose to add or not to add a wavelength filter
before the monitoring detector and observe the differ-
ences.
Finally, we note that a commercial CV-QKD system, as
sold by [15], currently uses a wavelength-dependent beam
splitter. Although, it does not fall into the regime studied
in this paper because it uses homodyne detection rather than
heterodyne detection. However, our results show that if one
were going to use heterodyne detection with a commercial
QKD unit, then the precautions mentioned here would need
to be taken. Furthermore, possible quantum hacking oppor-
tunities with homodyne detection and wavelength-dependent
beam splitters warrant further investigation.
In conclusion, we have proposed a new type of realistic
quantum hacking attack, namely the wavelength attack, on
continuous-variable QKD systems using heterodyne detec-
tion. If Alice and Bob don’t take the necessary precautions
for such an attack, the final secret key is in principle, totally
insecure as Eve can obtain all the information about the final
key. This is different from the equal-amplitude attack pro-
posed in Ref. [20] as in the wavelength attack, Eve has the
ability to control Bob’s beam splitter and therefore the sug-
gestion of testing the total intensity in Ref. [20] would not
prevent such an attack from occurring. To close such a loop-
hole in practical CV-QKD systems, it is simply enough for
Bob to randomly add a wavelength filter before his detection.
Added note: To suppress the shot noise, Eve can also apply
squeezed state instead of coherent state to generate the fake
pulses. In this case, the constraint about maximum fake pulse
intensity can be loosed. We would like to thank Dr. Bing Qi
for providing this idea to us.
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Appendix A: Achievable XE and PE
We estimate the achievable range of XE and PE in this
appendix. Before the analysis, let us first rewrite Eq. (4) as
follow
T (λ) = F 2 sin2
(Cw
F
λ5/2
)
= sin2(AX), (A1)
where A = CwF and X = λ
5/2
, here we set F=1 for sim-
plicity. For the 50 : 50 BS, T (λ0) = sin2(AX0) = 0.5
where λ0 = 1550nm, hence AX0 = arcsin(
√
0.5). For
other wavelengths, AX = arcsin(
√
T (λ)) and we can get
X =
arcsin(
√
T (λ))
arcsin(0.5) X0.
For the 10 : 90 BS, we similarly rewrite its transmis-
sion as T ′(λ) = sin2(BX) and easily derive that BX0 =
arcsin(
√
0.9). Therefore,
T ′(λ) = sin2(
arcsin(
√
T (λ))
arcsin
√
0.5
arcsin
√
0.9). (A2)
Moreover, as it is mentioned in Sec. IV A, for suppress-
ing the shot noise we should make |α′′s | ≡ T ′1|α′s|2 and
|α′′LO| ≡ T ′2|α′LO|2 much smaller than |αLO|2. In a practi-
cal CV QKD system, the LO pulse arrived at Bob’s side typi-
cally includes more than 108 photons[14]. For this reason, we
constrain the maximum value of both |α′′s |2 and |α′′LO|2 to be
106 ≤ 10−2|αLO|2. On the other hand, to guarantee condition
(i), Eve should also make (1 − T ′1)|α′s|2 and (1 − T ′2)|α′LO|2
not larger than 5 × 106. We then get the following maximum
value constrains on the fake state intensities:
|α′′s |2 ≤Min{106, 5T
′
1
1−T ′
1
106},
|α′′LO|2 ≤Min{106, 5T
′
2
1−T ′
2
106}. (A3)
From condition (ii) and (iii), we can get
√
ηXE =
2[(1−T1)(1−2T1)|α′′s |2+(1−T2)(2T2−1)|α′′LO|2]
|αLO| ,√
ηPE =
2[T1(1−2T1)|α′′s |2+T2(2T2−1)|α′′LO|2]
|αLO| .
(A4)
7Combining Eq. (A2), (A3) and (3), now we have enough in-
formation to derive the achievable value range of XE and
PE by analytical calculations or numerical simulations. Ei-
ther of these methods shows that (√ηXE ,√ηPE) satisfy-
ing η|XE |2 + η|PE |2 < 20 are always achievable. To see
how high the probability of |XE |(or |PE |) > 20 is, we can
apply the error integral function erfc(x) = 2√
pi
∫∞
x e
−x2dx
and get P [|√ηXE | > 20 or |√ηPE | > 20] = erfc( 20√2V ),
where V is the variance of XE and PE chosen by Gaussian
distribution[32]. For an experimentally realistic value V=11,
we get erfc( 20√
22
) = 1.637× 10−9 ≈ 0, which concludes our
claim in Sec. III. When XE or PE is out of reach, Eve can
simply turn to perform the original intercept-resend strategy.
The extra noise it involves is 1 (shot noise unit) times this ex-
tremely low probability, which is negligible.
Appendix B: Derivation of VNB
To deriveVNB , let us start from the generation of Eve’s fake
states. As we have described in Section III, Eve generates
the fake signal state and the fake LO state according to her
measurement results and sends them to Bob. These fake states
can be described by the following operators
αˆ′s = α
′
s + δaˆ
′
s,
αˆ′LO = α
′
LO + δaˆ
′
LO.
(B1)
Where complex numbers α′s and α′LO are the amplitudes and
δaˆ′s and δaˆ′LO represent the fluctuations of the amplitudes as
discussed in Section II A. Similarly, 〈(δXˆ ′k)2〉 = 〈(δPˆ ′k)2〉 =
1, where δXˆk = δaˆ′k+δaˆ
′†
k and δPˆk = −i(δaˆ′k−δaˆ
′†
k ), k = s,
LO. After the (original) 10 : 90 beam splitter, they are turned
to be
αˆ′′s =
√
T ′1αˆ
′
s +
√
1− T ′1δaˆv1
= α′′s + δaˆ
′′
s ,
αˆ′′LO =
√
T ′2αˆ
′
LO +
√
1− T ′2δaˆ′v2
= α′′LO + δaˆ
′′
LO,
(B2)
where δaˆv1, δaˆv2 are the vacuum noises that interfere with the
fake signal and the fake LO, respectively, at the beam splitter.
α′′s ≡
√
T ′1α
′
s, δaˆ
′′
s ≡
√
T ′1δaˆ
′
s +
√
1− T ′1δaˆ′v1 and similar
to LO.
Bob performs heterodyne detection on these fake states.
According to Eq. (4), Bob’s beam splitter has different inten-
sity transmissions for αˆ′′s and αˆ′′LO because of their different
wavelengths, denoted as T1 and T2. After passing the first set
of beam splitters, αˆ′′s is separated into αˆ1 and αˆ3, while αˆ′′LO is
separated into αˆ2 and αˆ4 (cf. Fig. 2), which can be expressed
as follows
αˆ1 =
√
1− T1αˆ′′s +
√
T1δaˆ
′
v1,
αˆ2 =
√
1− T2αˆ′′LO +
√
T2δaˆ
′
v2,
αˆ3 =
√
T1αˆ
′′
s −
√
1− T1δaˆ′v1,
αˆ4 = e
ipi
2 (
√
T2αˆ
′′
LO −
√
1− T2δaˆ′v2),
(B3)
To simplify the symbols, let us define δαˆ1 ≡
√
1− T1δaˆ′′s +√
T1δαˆ
′
v1, δαˆ2 ≡
√
1− T2δaˆ′′LO +
√
T2δαˆ
′
v2, δαˆ3 ≡√
T1δaˆ
′′
s −
√
1− T1δαˆ′v1 and δαˆ4 ≡
√
T2δaˆ
′′
LO −√
1− T2δαˆ′v2. Furthermore, we define the quadratures of δαˆk
by δXˆk = δαˆk + δαˆ†k and δPˆk = −i(δαˆk − δαˆ†k) where
k = 1, 2, 3, 4. Finally, after combining at the second set of
beam splitters, the electromagnetic fields arrive at the four de-
tectors can be written as
bˆ1 =
√
1− T1αˆ1 +
√
T1δαˆ
′′
v1 +
√
T2αˆ2 +
√
1− T2δαˆ′′v2,
bˆ2 =
√
T1αˆ1 −
√
1− T1δαˆ′′v1 −
√
1− T2αˆ2 +
√
T2δαˆ
′′
v2,
bˆ3 =
√
1− T1αˆ3 +
√
T1δαˆ
′′
v3 +
√
T2αˆ4 +
√
1− T2δαˆ′′v4,
bˆ4 =
√
T1αˆ3 −
√
1− T1δαˆ′′v3 −
√
1− T2αˆ4 +
√
T2δαˆ
′′
v4.
(B4)
where the photocurrents are given by iˆk = qbˆ†kbˆk. Bob’s
quadrature measurement results are then derived from the dif-
ference in photocurrents, using the method in Section II A.
Firstly, for detectors D1 and D2, we have
iˆx = iˆ1 − iˆ2
= q(bˆ†1bˆ1 − bˆ†2bˆ2)
= q{(1− 2T1)[(1− T1)|α′′s |2 +
√
1− T1(α′′∗s δαˆ1 + α′′s δαˆ†1)]
+(2T2 − 1)[(1− T2)|α′′LO|2 +
√
1− T2(α′′∗LOδαˆ2 + α′′LOδαˆ†2)]
+2
√
T1(1− T1)(α′′∗s δαˆ′′v1 + α′′s δαˆ
′′†
v1) + 2
√
T2(1− T2)(α′′∗LOδαˆ′′v2 + α′′LOδαˆ
′′†
v2)
+
√
(1− T1)T2[
√
(1− T1)(1− T2)(α′′∗s α′′LO + α′′sα
′′∗
LO) +
√
1− T1(α′′∗s δαˆ2 + α′′s δαˆ†2) +
√
1− T2(α′′LOδαˆ†1 + α′′∗LOαˆ1)]
−
√
(1− T2)T1[
√
(1− T1)(1− T2)(α′′∗s α′′LO + α′′sα
′′∗
LO) +
√
1− T1(α′′∗s δαˆ2 + α′′s δαˆ†2) +
√
1− T2(α′′LOδαˆ†1 + α′′∗LOαˆ1)]
+(
√
T1T2(1− T2)−
√
(1 − T1)(1 − T2)2)(α′′LOδαˆ
′′†
v1 + α
′′∗
LOδαˆ
′′
v1)
+(
√
(1− T1)2(1− T2)−
√
T1T2(1− T1))(α′′s δαˆ
′′†
v2 + α
′′∗
s δαˆ
′′
v2)}.
(B5)
Where the terms δαˆ†δαˆ are already neglected. Note that αˆ′LO and αˆ′s have different frequencies, therefore any terms not
containing the product of the same frequencies vanish during the measurement. The remaining terms compose the measurem
8result of iˆx
iˆx = q[(1− T1)(1 − 2T1)|α′′s |2 + (1− 2T1)
√
1− T1(α′′∗s δαˆ1 + α′′sδαˆ†1)
+(1− T2)(2T2 − 1)|α′′LO|2 + (2T2 − 1)
√
1− T2(α′′∗LOδαˆ2 + α′′LOδαˆ†2)
+2
√
T1(1 − T1)(α′′∗s δαˆ′′v1 + α′′s δαˆ′′†v1) + 2
√
T2(1 − T2)(α′′∗LOδαˆ′v2 + α′′LOδαˆ′′†v2)].
(B6)
Similarly, we get the measurement result of iˆp as:
iˆp = iˆ3 − iˆ4 = q(bˆ†3bˆ3 − bˆ†4bˆ4)
= q[T1(1 − 2T1)|α′′s |2 + (1− 2T1)
√
T1(α
′′∗
s δαˆ3 + α
′′
s δαˆ
†
3)
+T2(2T2 − 1)|α′′LO|2 + (2T2 − 1)
√
T2(α
′′∗
LOδαˆ4 + α
′′
LOδαˆ
†
4)
+2T1
√
1− T1(α′′∗s δα′′v3 + α′′s δα′′†v3) + i2T2
√
1− T2(α′′LOδα′′†v4 − α′′∗LOδα′′v4)].
(B7)
Notice that the squared modulus terms in the last two equations are what helped us derive the set of conditions in Eq. (5). The
measurement results corresponding to Bob’s quadratures XˆB and PˆB are then calculated using Eq. (3):
XˆB =
2ˆix
q|αLO|
=
2[(1−T1)(1−2T1)|α′′s |2+(1−T2)(2T2−1)|α′′LO|2]
|αLO|
+
2[(1−2T1)
√
1−T1(α′′∗s δαˆ1+α′′s δαˆ†1)+(2T2−1)
√
1−T2(α′′∗LOδαˆ2+α′′LOδαˆ†2)]
|αLO|
+
4[
√
T1(1−T1)(α′′∗s δαˆ′′v1+α′′s δαˆ
′′†
v1 )+
√
T2(1−T2)(α′′∗LOδαˆ′′v2+α′′LOδαˆ
′′†
v2 )]
|αLO|
=
√
ηXE + XˆNB,
PˆB =
2ˆix
q|αLO|
=
2[T1(1−2T1)|α′′s |2+T2(2T2−1)|α′′LO|2]
|αLO|
+
2[(1−2T1)
√
T1(α
′′∗
s δαˆ3+α
′′
s δαˆ
†
3
)+(2T2−1)
√
T2(α
′′∗
LOδαˆ4+α
′′
LOδαˆ
†
4
)]
|αLO|
+
4[T1
√
1−T1(α′′∗s δα′′v3+α′′s δα′′†v3 )+iT2
√
1−T2(α′′LOδα′′†v4−α′′∗LOδα′′v4)]
|αLO|
=
√
ηPE + PˆNB .
(B8)
where we have used conditions (ii) and (iii) from Eq. (5). Let α′′LO and α′′s be real, we then get the following inequalities:
XˆNB =
2[(1−2T1)
√
1−T1α′′s (δαˆ1+δαˆ†1)+(2T2−1)
√
1−T2α′′LO(δαˆ2+δαˆ†2)]
|αLO|
+
4[
√
T1(1−T1)α′′s (δαˆ′′v1+δαˆ′′†v1 )+
√
T2(1−T2)α′′LO(δαˆ′′v2+δαˆ
′′†
v2 )]
|αLO|
PˆNB =
2[
√
T1(1−2T1)α′′s (δαˆ3+δαˆ†3)+
√
T2(2T2−1)α′′LO(δαˆ2+δαˆ†4)]
|αLO|
+
4[T1
√
1−T1α′′s (δα′′v3+δα′′†v3 )+iT2
√
1−T2α′′LO(δα′′†v4−δα′′v4)]
|αLO|
(B9)
Therefore,
VNB,x = 〈(XˆNB)2〉
=
4[〈(1−2T1)2(1−T1)α
′′
2
s δX
2
1
〉+〈(2T2−1)2(1−T2)α
′′
2
LOδX
2
2
〉]
|αLO|2
+
16[〈T1(1−T1)2α
′′
2
s δX
′′
2
v1 〉+〈T2(1−T2)2α
′′
2
LOδX
′′
2
v2 〉]
|αLO|2
< 13× max{|α′′s |2,|α′′LO|2}|αLO|2 = 0.13,
(B10)
VNB,p = 〈(PˆNB)2〉
=
4[〈(1−2T1)2T1α
′′
2
s δX
2
3
〉+〈(2T2−1)2T2α
′′
2
LOδX
2
4
〉]
|αLO|2
+
16[〈T 2
1
(1−T1)α
′′
2
s δX
′′
2
v3 〉+〈T 22 (1−T2)α
′′
2
LOδX
′′
2
v4 〉]
|αLO|2
< 13× max{|α′′s |2,|α′′LO|2}|αLO|2 = 0.13.
(B11)
Here we use the facts that the maximum values of (1 −
2T )2(1−T ), (1−2T )2T , T (1−T )2 and T 2(1−T ) are 1, 1, 427
and 427 respectively, 〈δX2〉 = 〈δP 2〉 = 1, and the constrain
of max{|α′′s |2, |α′′LO|2} < 10−2|αLO|2(see Appendix A).
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